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Abstract— Infrared (IR) light is invisible to humans, but 
cameras are optically sensitive to this type of light.   
 
In this paper, we show how attackers can use surveillance 
cameras and infrared light to establish bi-directional covert 
communication between the internal networks of organizations 
and remote attackers. We present two scenarios: exfiltration 
(leaking data out of the network) and infiltration (sending data 
into the network). Exfiltration. Surveillance and security 
cameras are equipped with IR LEDs, which are used for night 
vision. In the exfiltration scenario, malware within the 
organization access the surveillance cameras across the local 
network and controls the IR illumination. Sensitive data such as 
PIN codes, passwords, and encryption keys are then modulated, 
encoded, and transmitted over the IR signals. An attacker in a 
public area (e.g., in the street) with a line of sight to the 
surveillance camera records the IR signals and decodes the 
leaked information. Infiltration. In an infiltration scenario, an 
attacker standing in a public area (e.g., in the street) uses IR 
LEDs to transmit hidden signals to the surveillance camera(s). 
Binary data such as command and control (C&C) and beacon 
messages are encoded on top of the IR signals. The signals 
hidden in the video stream are then intercepted and decoded by 
the malware residing in the network. The exfiltration and 
infiltration can be combined to establish bidirectional, 'air-gap' 
communication between the compromised network and the 
attacker. We discuss related work and provide scientific 
background about this optical channel. We implement a 
malware prototype and present data modulation schemas and a 
basic transmission protocol. Our evaluation of the covert 
channel shows that data can be covertly exfiltrated from an 
organization at a rate of 20 bit/sec per surveillance camera to a 
distance of tens of meters away. Data can be covertly infiltrated 
into an organization at a rate of over 100 bit/sec per surveillance 
camera from a distance of hundreds of meters to kilometers 
away. These transmission rates can be increased further when 
several surveillance cameras are used. 
 
Keywords— exfiltration; infiltration; air-gap; network; optical; 
covert channel; infrared; security camera  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Organizations often protect their internal networks from 
Internet attacks by using firewalls, intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs). For a higher 
degree of protection, so-called 'air-gap' isolation is used. In this 
case, the internal network is kept disconnected from the 
Internet, without any physical or logical connection. Air-gap 
isolation is commonly used in military networks, critical 
infrastructures, financial industries, and other settings [1] [2].    
In the past decade it has been shown that firewalls, IDSs, IPSs 
and air-gap isolation do not provide hermetic protection. 
Motivated attackers can evade any level of separation and infect 
an organization’s internal network with malware. In order to 
breach the target networks, attackers have used complex attack 
vectors, such as supply chain attacks, malicious insiders, and 
social engineering [3].  
In 2008, a classified network of the United States military was 
compromised by a computer worm named Agent.Btz [3]. 
According to reports [4], a foreign intelligence agency supplied 
infected thumb drives to retail kiosks near NATO headquarters 
in Kabul. A malicious thumb drive was put into a USB port of 
a laptop computer that was attached to United States Central 
Command. The worm spread further to both classified and 
unclassified networks. Other attacks on secure networks in the 
governmental, financial, and IT sectors have also been reported 
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9].    
 Covert Channels 
With its malware deployed on the target network, the attacker 
might wish to establish a communication with it. For example, 
the attacker may want to deliver command and control (C&C) 
messages to the malware or leak data out of the compromised 
network. Over the years, various covert communication 
channels have been proposed. These communication channels 
allow attackers to communicate with highly secured networks 
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demo video: http://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap 
while bypassing firewalls, IDSs, and IPSs. To evade detection, 
attackers may hide the data within TCP/IP headers, HTTPS 
requests, transferred images, and other data streams sent over 
the network. However, the traditional covert channels depend 
on network connectivity between the attacker and the target 
network. 
 Air-Gap Covert Channels  
Air-Gap covert channels are a special type of covert channel 
that can operate on air-gapped networks (i.e., they are a covert 
channel that doesn't require network connectivity between the 
attacker and the target network). In air-gap covert channels, 
attackers may leak data through different types of radiation 
emitted from the computer. Leaking data using electromagnetic 
radiation has been investigated for more than twenty years. In 
this method, malware controls the electromagnetic radiation 
emitted from computer parts, such as LCD screens, 
communication cables, computer buses, and other components 
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14]. Other air-gap covert channels are based 
on sonic and ultrasonic sound [15] [16] and heat emissions [17]. 
In optical covert channels, information is leaked via optical 
signals controlled by the malware. The optical signals can be 
generated by the hard drive activity LEDs [18], keyboard LEDs 
[19], router LEDs [20], implanted IR LEDs [21], and via 
invisible images on the screen [22]. Most optical methods are 
not considered completely covert, since they can easily be 
detected by people who notice the optical activity (e.g., blinking 
LEDs). 
 Surveilance and Security Cameras 
In recent years, there were several cases in which security and 
surveillance cameras has been compromised by attackers [23] 
[24]. For example, in January 2017, two hackers were 
reportedly arrested in London on suspicion of hacking 70% of 
the CCTV cameras in Washington [25]. A comprehensive 
analysis of the threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks on video 
surveillance, closed-circuit TV, and IP camera systems is 
presented by Costin in [26].  
 
 Our Contribution    
In this paper we introduce a new type of covert channel that 
uses infrared (IR) light and surveillance cameras for data 
exfiltration and infiltration.  
 
Exfiltration. Many surveillance and security cameras are 
equipped with IR LEDs which enable night vision. We show 
that malware residing within the internal networks of the 
organization can control these IR LEDs, turning them on and 
off or controlling their IR intensity. We implement a malware 
prototype and show that binary data can be encoded over the IR 
signals and leaked to an attacker from a distance of tens of 
meters away. Notably, many surveillance and security cameras 
monitor public areas, and therefore attackers can easily 
establish a line of sight with them. 
 
Infiltration. Cameras can 'see' light at the IR wavelength but 
humans cannot. We show that an attacker can generate IR 
signals that will be recorded by the surveillance cameras, in 
order to deliver C&C messages to malware within the 
organization. With access to the video stream recorded by the 
surveillance camera, the malware can detect the covert signals 
and decode the C&C messages. 
 
The proposed covert channel has the following advantages: (1) 
invisibility: IR is invisible to humans, hence our method is 
considered optically covert. Most existing optical channels use 
light in the visible range (e.g., computer LEDs) which is visible 
to humans, (2) software based: our method doesn't require 
dedicated hardware and simply exploits surveillance cameras 
that exist in all secured organizations today, (3) 
communication over the air-gap: our method works even 
when there is no network connection between the attacker and 
the malware in the organization.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the attack scenarios. In Section III we present related 
work. Technical background about IR light and cameras is 
provided in Section IV. Data encoding and decoding are 
discussed in Section V. Signal generation is described in 
Section VI. In Section VII we present the evaluation and 
analysis. Countermeasures are discussed in Section VIII, and 
we present our conclusions in Section IX. 
 
II. ATTACK SCENARIOS 
We introduce an IR based covert channel which is relevant to 
two scenarios; exfiltration and infiltration. In the exfiltration 
scenario, information is leaked out from the organization’s 
internal networks to a remote attacker. Such information 
includes passwords, PIN codes, encryption keys, and 
keylogging data. In the infiltration scenario, information is 
delivered from a remote attacker to the organization’s internal 
networks. Such information might consist of C&C messages for 
malware residing in the network.        
 
 Intrusion & Infection 
Like a typical advanced persistent threat (APT), in the initial 
stage of the attack an internal network within the organization 
is compromised with malware. Compromising secured and 
even isolated (air-gapped) networks can be accomplished with 
various attack vectors such as supply chain attacks, malicious 
insiders, or social engineering [3]. Once within the network, the 
malware scans the IPs to find the surveillance and security 
cameras connected to the local network. Surveillance cameras 
can be located in the network by examining the open ports, 
HTTP response, or MAC access of the objects in the network. 
After mapping the surveillance cameras the malware must be 
able to connect to the cameras in order to receive their input 
stream and modify their settings (e.g., control the IR LEDs). 
Connecting to the camera usually requires a password which 
can be retrieved from a computer in the network that has an 
access to the cameras, or by exploiting a vulnerability in the 
camera's software/firmware [26] [25] [23] [24].   
  Exfiltration 
The exfiltration scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. The malware 
in the network collects sensitive data that it wants to exfiltrate. 
When the data is collected, the malware transmits it by 
encoding it over the IR signals emitted from the camera’s night 
vision IR LEDs. Exfiltration may take place at predefined times 
or as the result of a trigger from the attacker side. An attacker 
located outside the secured facility (e.g., on the street) can 
receive the IR signals by carrying a standard video camera that 
is aimed at the transmitting surveillance camera. The received 
video is then processed in order to decode the transmitted data. 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the exfiltration covert channel; malware 
accesses the surveillance camera and transmits invisible signals to 
a remote attacker by using the IR LEDs on cameras.  
 
 Infiltration 
The infiltration scenario is illustrated in Figure 2. An attacker 
located outside the secured facility (e.g., on the street) generates 
invisible IR signals by using IR LEDs. The IR signals are 
modulated with the C&C messages to be delivered to the 
malware. The video stream recorded by the surveillance camera 
is received by the malware which processes and decodes the 
transmitted data.  
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the infiltration covert channel; IR LEDs 
transmit invisible signals to the camera. The signals are received 
by malware with access to the surveillance camera. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 provides some details regarding the two scenarios. 
 
Table 1. The exfiltration and infiltration scenarios 
Scenario Transmitter Receiver Type of 
transmissions 
Exfiltration 
(leaking 
data out of 
the 
network) 
Surveillance 
cameras’ IR 
LEDs 
Video 
camera  
Brief 
information 
(e.g., PIN codes, 
passwords, 
encryption 
keys). 
Infiltration 
(sending 
C&C  
messages to 
the 
network) 
IR LEDs  Surveillance 
cameras 
Command and 
Control (C&C 
messages 
 
 Using Several Cameras 
Organizations often use CCTV systems consisting of many 
outdoor surveillance cameras to secure their facilities and 
monitor the areas around them. Within the context of this covert 
channel, this means that the attacker can choose the best 
location to conduct the attack. In addition, the covert channel 
can be established with more than one surveillance camera in 
order to multiply the channel’s bandwidth. Figure 3 presents the 
layout of surveillance cameras in a typical secured building. 
Each of the three outdoor cameras can exfiltrate data to an 
attacker with a line of sight to the camera, and each of these 
cameras can receive IR signals from a remote attacker. 
 
 
Figure 3. The layout of three surveillance cameras in a typical 
secured building. Each of the cameras can be used for exfiltration 
and infiltration from different angels and positions. 
 Other Types of Cameras 
Besides indoor and outdoor surveillance cameras, many 
doorbell cameras are also equipped with controllable IR LEDs 
(Figure 4). Like surveillance cameras, these types of cameras 
can also be used for exfiltration and infiltration. Note that 
doorbell cameras are typically installed at locations and heights 
which make it easy for an attacker to obtain a line of sight. In a 
typical scenario the attacker stands in front of, or at a short 
distance from, a doorbell camera while exchanging data via 
covert IR signals. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Doorbell cameras with IR LEDs 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
Conventional covert communication channels depend on 
network connectivity between the attacker and the target 
network. In these covert channels, attackers may hide the data 
within TCP/IP headers, HTTPS requests, transferred images, 
and other data streams sent over the network [27] [28]. 
However, in cases where there is no direct connection with the 
target network, the attacker may resort to so-called air-gap 
covert channels.  
Communication over air-gaps can be established via 
electromagnetic, acoustic, thermal, and optical emanations. In 
1998, Anderson [11] show how to leak data using 
electromagnetic waves emanating from display screens. 
AirHopper [10] [29] is malware introduced recently that 
exfiltrates data by using FM radio signals emanating from the 
video card. In 2015, Guri et al presented GSMem [14], malware 
that leaks data from air-gapped computers using cellular 
frequencies emitted from RAM buses. USB buses and GPIOs 
also generate electromagnetic signals that can be exploited for 
data exfiltration [30] [31].  
Hanspach addresses covert channels via ultrasonic sound waves 
[32]. He used laptop speakers and microphones to transmit data 
between air-gapped computers. In 2016, Guri et al presented 
Fansmitter [33] and DiskFiltration [34], two methods enabling 
exfiltration of data via sound waves, when the computers are 
not equipped with speakers or audio hardware. They used the 
computer fans and hard disk drive to generate acoustic signals. 
BitWhisper [35], a method presented in 2015, established 
covert communication between two adjacent air-gapped 
computers using heat emissions.  
Several optical channels have also been proposed over the 
years. Loughry studied data exfiltration via the keyboard LEDs 
[19]. In this attack, malware sends data by blinking the caps-
lock, num-lock and scroll-lock LEDs. More recently, Guri et al 
presented a covert channel that enables data leakage from air-
gapped networks via the hard drive indicator LED [18]. 
VisiSploit [22] is an optical based covert channel in which data 
is leaked through a hidden image projected on an LCD screen. 
The 'invisible' image is obtained by a remote camera and is then 
reconstructed using image processing. Lopes [21] presented an 
IR covert channel based on a malicious hardware component 
with implanted IR LEDs.  By blinking the IR LEDs an attacker 
can leak sensitive data stored on the device, such as credentials 
and cryptographic keys, at a speed of 15 bit/sec. However, in 
their method the attacker must find a way to insert the 
compromised hardware into the organization. In contrast, our 
method uses the IR LEDs that already exist in surveillance and 
security cameras and doesn’t require special or malicious 
hardware. Note that the threat of using the surveillance camera 
for exfiltration was also discussed by Costin in its 
comprehensive analysis on the security of CCTV system [26]. 
Our paper focus on this threat and presents the attack model, 
design, analysis, implementation and evaluation of the attack. 
A list of existing air-gap covert channels is presented in Table 
2. 
 
Our optical covert channel has two unique characteristics: 
Invisibility. Unlike existing optical covert channels which use 
visible light (e.g., keyboard LEDs), the proposed covert channel 
is based on IR light which is optically invisible to humans. That 
makes the channel more covert compared to the existing covert 
channels. 
Bidirectional. The proposed channel can be used for both 
exfiltration and infiltration, which allows the attacker to 
establish bidirectional communication with the target network. 
Existing optical covert channels are only capable of exfiltration. 
 
IV. INFRARED (IR) AND CAMERAS 
In this section, we briefly present the technical background 
relevant to the covert channel. We discuss IR light, the cameras 
and their sensitivity to IR light, and some optical aspects of the 
communication.  
 Infrared Light 
A healthy human eye of an adult is sensitive to only a small 
segment of the optical wavelengths that exist, namely from 
Table 2. Different types of air-gap covert channels 
Type Method 
Electromagnetic AirHopper [11] [25] 
GSMem [15] 
USBee [26] 
Funthenna [13] 
Acoustic [17] [16] [30] [62] [53] 
Fan noise (Fansmitter) [32]  
Hard disk noise (DiskFiltration) 
[34] 
Thermal BitWhisper [34] 
Optical  Hard Drive LED (LED-it-GO) [18] 
VisiSploit (invisible pixels) 
Keyboard LEDs  [20]  
Screen LEDs [21] 
Implanted infrared LEDs [21] 
Router LEDs [16] 
 
~400nm to ~700nm. This range is also known as the visible 
range. For a typical consumer camera, the sensitivity range is 
slightly wider, from ~350nm to ~1050nm, including a portion 
of near-ultraviolet (NUV) and near-infrared (NIR) light, as 
presented in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. A typical spectral sensitivity range of cameras. 
 
Typically, modern cameras (both video and still cameras) can 
record lighting in the NIR range. Figure 6 contains two versions 
of an IR projector that consists of 192 IR LEDs. Version 1 
shows how the projector appears to the human observer, and 
version 2 shows how the IR LEDs on the projector appear in a 
photo taken by a Samsung Galaxy smartphone, thus 
demonstrating the ability of a camera to record lighting in the 
IR range.  
 
 
Figure 6. An IR projector as it is appears to a human observer (1) 
and to a camera (in a photo taken by a smartphone camera) (2). 
The IR light is invisible to a human observer. 
 
 Camera IR LEDs (night vision capability) 
In order to provide night vision capability, surveillance cameras 
use lighting in the NIR range. Note that the NUV range is not 
used due to the strict eye safety guidelines regarding the use of 
NUV light. Note that during the daytime, the presence/absence 
of NIR lighting has a negligible influence, since it has 
significantly less power than that of other typical types of 
outdoor illumination. Cameras with night vision capability have 
IR LEDs positioned around the outer edges of the camera lens 
which illuminate during low light conditions. With IR 
illumination cameras can capture objects from tens of meters 
away, even in total darkness. The camera's IR lights typically 
has central wavelength of about 850 nm, spectral full-width 
half-maximum (FWHM) of about 45-50 nm and power of few 
watts. They are also organized in arrays of LEDs for higher joint 
lighting power.   
  
 
1) IR LED Control  
In many high-end surveillance cameras, the IR intensity levels 
can be adjusted to fit different environmental lighting 
conditions. Typically, low levels of IR illumination are used 
when there is ambient light in the area, whereas high levels are 
used in the case of total darkness or low ambient lightening. 
Figure 7 shows two high-end security cameras: the Sony SNC-
EM602RC (top) and Sony SNC-EB600 (bottom), with their IR 
LEDs turned on. The intensity of IR increases from level 0 in 
the leftmost images to level 4 in the rightmost images. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Two high-end surveillance cameras, with five levels of 
IR intensity (0=lowest, 4=highest). 
 
As presented in this paper, the changes in the lighting level may 
be used for data modulation. The modulation frequency is 
limited only by the camera's hardware, since the maximum 
modulation frequency of the typical LEDs is about 2 MHz. The 
changes in lighting levels that are perceptible to a camera user 
are termed flickering. Nevertheless, if lighting change 
frequency is carefully chosen, flickering may be avoided [36]. 
 
 Line-of-sight (LOS) and Non line-of-sight (NLOS) 
There are two ways of communicating between the camera and 
the IR source: line of sight communication (LOS) and non-line 
of sight (NLOS) commination. LOS communication is 
illustrated in Figure 8. For the exfiltration scenario (a), the IR 
LEDs of the surveillance camera are directed toward the NIR 
optical receiver. For the infiltration scenario (b), the NIR 
transmitter is directed toward the surveillance camera. NLOS 
communication is illustrated in Figure 9. For the exfiltration 
scenario (a), the area illuminated by the IR LEDs of the 
surveillance camera is located within the field of view (FOV) 
of the dedicated optical receiver. For the infiltration scenario 
(b), the NIR transmitter is directed toward the FOV of the 
surveillance camera. Note that in NLOS communication the 
receiver itself may be remain invisible from the transmitting 
surveillance camera. More detailed discussion regarding the 
effectiveness of LOS and NLOS communication is presented in 
Section VII. 
 
 
Figure 8. Illustration of LOS communication: (a) exfiltration and 
(b) infiltration. 
 
Figure 9. Illustration of NLOS communication: (a) exfiltration and 
(b) infiltration. 
 
 
V. DATA ENCODING & DECODING 
In this section we discuss data encoding and decoding. Note that 
the topic of visible light communication (VLC) has been widely 
studied in the past. In particular, various modulations and 
encoding schemes have been proposed for LED communication 
[37] [38] [39]. We present basic encoding schemes and describe 
their characteristics, and also present simple bit framing. Recall 
that high-end cameras may have more than one level of IR 
illumination. Given 𝑛 possible levels, we denote them as LED-
ON0, LED-ON1, LED-ON2… LED-ONn-1. 
 Data Encoding 
On-off keying (OOK). In this type of modulation, the absence 
of a signal for a certain duration encodes zero ('0'), while its 
presence for the same duration encodes one ('1'). In our case, 
LED-ONa for duration of 𝑇௢௙௙ encodes '0' and LED-ONb for a 
duration 𝑇௢௡ encodes '1,' where 0 ≤ a,b < 𝑛 − 1. The OOK 
encoding is described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. On-off-keying (OOK) modulation 
Logical bit Duration LED state 
0  𝑇௢௙௙ LED-ONa  
1 𝑇௢௡ LED-ONb 
 
Frequency-shift keying (FSK). In this modulation, the data is 
modulated through frequency changes in a carrier signal. In the 
simple form which is called binary frequency-shift keying (B-
FSK), only two frequencies are used for modulation. In our 
case, LED-ONa for a duration of 𝑇௢௙௙ encodes '0' and LED-ONa 
for duration 𝑇௢௡  encodes '1,' where 0 ≤ a,b < 𝑛 − 1. We 
separate between two bits by setting the LED-ONb state for a 
time interval of 𝑇ௗ . The B-FSK encoding is described in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4. Binary frequency-shift keying (B-FSK) modulation 
Logical bit Duration LED state 
0 𝑇௢௙௙  LED-ONa 
1 𝑇௢௡  LED-ONa 
Interval  𝑇ௗ  LED-ONb 
 
Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK). As was mentioned in the 
previous section, in professional surveillance cameras it is 
possible to control the level of the light illuminated by the IR 
LEDs. In ASK modulation, different levels (different 
amplitudes) of IR light are used to represent a different 
sequence of bits. Table 5 presents a case in which the IR LEDs 
can have five different levels: 𝐴଴, 𝐴ଵ, 𝐴ଶ, 𝐴ଷ and 𝐴ସ.  
 
Table 5. Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) 
Logical 
bits 
Duration Amplitude LED state 
00 𝑇௢௡ 𝐴ଵ LED-ON1 
01 𝑇௢௡ 𝐴ଶ LED-ON2 
10 𝑇௢௡ 𝐴ଷ LED-ON3 
11 𝑇௢௡ 𝐴ସ LED-ON4 
Interval 𝑇ௗ  𝐴଴ LED-ON0 
 
In this case, setting the IR level to 𝐴ଵ for a duration of 𝑇௢௡ ,  
encodes '00,' setting the IR level to 𝐴ଶ for a duration of 𝑇௢௡  
encodes '01,' and so on. We insert a separation between two 
sequential bytes by setting the LEDs in the 𝐴଴ level at a time 
interval of 𝑇ௗ . 
 Bit Framing 
We transmit the data in small packets, or frames, each 
composed of a preamble, a payload, and a checksum. 
Preamble. The preamble consists of a sequence of eight 
alternating bits ('10101010'), and it helps the receiver determine 
the properties of the channel, such as 𝑇௢௡ and 𝑇௢௙௙ .  In addition, 
the preamble header allows the receiver to synchronize with the 
beginning of a transmission and calibrate other parameters, 
such as the LEDs' location and the IR levels. Payload. The 
payload is the raw data to be transmitted. In our case, we choose 
256 bits as the payload size. CRC. For error detection, a 16 bit 
CRC (cyclic redundancy check) value is added to the end of the 
frame. The receiver calculates the CRC for the received 
payload, and if it differs from the received CRC, an error is 
detected.  
 
 Video Processing and Data Decoding 
For video processing we use OpenCV [40], which is an open-
source computer vision library that focuses on real-time video 
processing for academic and commercial use. Our program 
obtains the video stream recorded from the camera and 
calculates the IR LEDs' timings and amplitude. To detect and 
enumerate IR flickering, we use the following fundamental 
approach used in LED based communication [41] [42]. For 
each LED in the frame, we calculate the brightness function 
𝑝௡(𝑥, 𝑦), where 𝑥, 𝑦 are the coordinates of a pixel in the image, 
and 𝑛 is a frame number. The algorithm calculates the intensity 
vector 𝑆௫,௬(𝑝଴, 𝑝ଵ,…, 𝑝ே) which describes the change of the 
illumination over time. The brightness of the LED is calculated 
as the quantized level of light intensity in the image at a point 
in the two-dimensional space. The algorithm determines the on 
and off brightness threshold values using the temporal mean of 
the sampled signals. Based on the intensity vector and threshold 
values, we demodulate the signals encoded in the video. 
 
 
Figure 10. ASK modulation decoded from a video stream 
containing IR signals. 
 
Figure 10 presents the output of the video processing algorithm 
on a video stream that contains IR signals. As can be seen in the 
figure, the data is encoded with ASK modulation with five 
amplitudes.  
 
VI. SIGNAL GENERATION 
In this section we discuss the implementation of the exfiltration 
and infiltration channels. 
 Exfiltration (via camera IR LEDs)  
The IR LEDs in surveillance cameras can be controlled by the 
appropriate API provided by its firmware. In the most basic 
way, the state of the IR LEDs can be adjusted from within the 
camera's Web interface. Figure 11 shows the Web interface 
provided for the Sony SNC surveillance cameras [43]. The user 
can set the night vision to manual/automatic mode, in order to 
turn the IR LEDs on and off and set the level of the IR 
illumination. 
 
 
Figure 11. The Web interface for the Sony SNC-EM602RC 
camera, with the IR LEDs' control. 
 
A malware needs to control the IR LED programmatically. One 
option for malware is to change the state of the IR LEDs by 
sending a POST request directly to the camera's HTTP server. 
The request will configure the IR LEDs' states according to the 
form fields provided by the Web interface. A more generic 
option is to use the control API provided with the camera SDK. 
The API allows applications to control the IR illumination and 
night vision settings from a user program. For example, the 
Sony SNC-EM602RC implements the LED IR control in the 
dynamic link library snccgiw_dotnet.dll within the 
Sony.SNC.CGIWrapper class. The two main functions that 
control the IR LEDs are SetDayNightStatus and 
SetIrIlluminatorMaxStrength. Invoking these 
functions causes an HTTP POST request to be sent to the 
camera's IP. Figure 12 shows the HTTP POST request sent to 
the camera (at 192.168.3.14) over the network, when the 
IR illumination level is changed through the camera's SDK. In 
this example the IRLed MaxStrength parameter is set to 
'1'. 
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Figure 12. The HTTP request for changing the IR intensity of the 
Sony camera.  
 
For testing and evaluation, we implemented a program which 
encodes a binary file and transmits it via the IR LEDs. The 
program receives the camera's IP, the encoding along with the 
IR intensities' (amplitudes) timing parameters 𝑇௢௡ and 𝑇௢௙௙, and 
the binary file to transmit. The program uses the camera's SDK 
to control the IR LEDs and transmit the file according to the 
selected encoding scheme and parameters. 
 Infiltration (via external IR LEDs) 
Since surveillance cameras can receive light in the IR 
wavelength, it is possible to deliver data into the organization 
through the video stream recorded by the surveillance cameras, 
using covert IR signals. For testing and evaluation, we 
implemented a system which can encode binary data over IR 
signals. We used a 12 volt IR projector consisting of 140 
(10x14) IR LEDs, with an IR illumination distance of 130 
meters. The LED switching is controlled by a Raspberry Pi via 
GPIO pin 40, which is connected to a MOSFET transistor 
(30N06LE) that in opened with three volts. We control the IR 
LEDs with a Python script which receives the encoding scheme 
along with the timing parameters 𝑇௢௡ and 𝑇௢௙௙ , and the binary 
file to transmit. The setup is presented in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. The setup for the IR signal generation. A Raspberry Pi 
(1) controls the IR projector (2) which consists of 140 LEDs. 
VII. EVALUATION & ANALYSIS 
We evaluated and analyzed the exfiltration and infiltration 
covert channels to examine their maximum bit rate and 
distance. For the exfiltration scenario we tested security 
cameras and used their IR LEDs to leak data. We checked how 
the emitted IR signals were received from various types of 
video cameras. For the infiltration scenario we used the setup 
presented in Figure 13 and used it to transmit modulated binary 
data. For the transmission we used the professional surveillance 
camera Sony SNC-EM602RC [43]. This camera is an indoor and 
outdoor camera that includes built-in IR LEDs, allowing the 
viewing of objects up to 30 meters away in complete darkness. 
This camera includes 20 IR LEDs with IR wavelength of 850 
nm. The camera has five different intensities of IR illumination.  
 Exfiltration  
We evaluated how the IR signals sent from the security camera 
are received by five types of camera receivers. These cameras 
represent different scenarios which an attacker can use to record 
the exfiltrated data. 
 
1) Bit Rate 
There are two main factors limiting the bandwidth in a case of 
exfiltration: the IR LED transition time and the frame rate 
measured in frames per second (FPS) of the receiving camera. 
  
 IR LED transition time. Our experiments on the Sony 
camera show that it takes about 50 ms to change the 
intensity of the IR LEDs from one level to another. This 
limitation may be a result of the LED hardware controller 
as well as the firmware implementation. This effectively 
limits the exfiltration bit rate to 20*log (𝑛) bit/sec, where 𝑛 
is the number of levels used in the modulation. Note that in 
the case of OOK, 𝑛 = 2. Note that this transition time may 
vary between different camera models and vendors.  
 
 The receiver FPS. The bit rate is also bounded by the 
frame rate of the receiving camera. We identify 2-3 frames 
as the minimal number of frames required to detect the 
presence of IR signals, e.g., the presence of illuminating IR 
LEDs on two sequential frames is the indication of a signal.   
 
Table 6 summarizes the maximal bit rate for the exfiltration 
channel for OOK and ASK modulation. The SNC-EM602RC 
camera was used for transmission, and five types of video 
cameras were used for the reception. For simplicity we used 
four levels of the IR illumination in the ASK modulation (out 
of five possible levels). The exfiltration channel is limited to 20 
bit/sec with OOK and 40 bit/sec for ASK modulation. This  
makes the exfiltration channel more suitable for the 
transmission of a small amount of data such as passwords, 
PINs, encryption keys, and so on. 
 
Table 6. Max bit rate for exfiltration with OOK and ASK 
modulations using different camera receivers 
Tested 
Camera/Sensor 
FPS Max bit 
rate (OOK) 
Max bit 
rate (ASK 
4 levels) 
Smartphone camera  
(Samsung Galaxy J7) 
30 - 60 15-20 
bit/sec 
30-40 
bit/sec 
Extreme camera  
(GoPro HERO5) 
60 - 240 20 bit/sec 40 bit/sec 
Entry-level DSLR  
(Nikon D7100) 
60 20 bit/sec  30 bit/sec 
Webcam (HD)  
(Microsoft LifeCam) 
30 15 bit/sec 30 bit/sec 
High-end security 
camera  
(Sony SNC-EB600) 
30 15 bit/sec  30 bit/sec 
 
 
 
Figure 14. The transmitting surveillance camera, as it seen by a 
human observer (1) and different camera receivers (2-5). 
 
Figure 14 shows the transmitting camera as it seen by (1) a 
human observer (the IR light is invisible), (2) a smartphone 
camera, (3) a professional video camera, (4) an extreme camera, 
and (5) an HD webcam. 
 
2) Stealth 
Since we modulate the data by changing the IR illumination, 
the change in the IR level is reflected in the video recorded by 
the security camera. It is possible that a person carefully 
watching the recorded video will notice the abnormal behavior 
in terms of the image brightness and reveal the covert channel. 
However, we found that shifting in the levels of IR illumination 
are difficult for a human observer to detect. This is mainly due 
to the brightness stabilizing techniques applied to the video 
stream. The following figures illustrate the transmission of 
'01' using level 0 (Figure 15) and level 1 (Figure 16) IR 
levels, as transmitted and recorded by the Sony SNC-
EM602RC camera.  
 
 
Figure 15. Transmission of '0' using IR level 0 as viewed from the 
transmitting camera. 
 
 
Figure 16. Transmission of '0' using IR level 1 as viewed from the 
transmitting camera. 
 
Table 7. The RGB values of the image in Figure 15 
 Avg Med Min Max 
RGB:R 121 112 29 249 
RGB:G 121 112 29 249 
RGB:B 121 112 29 249 
 
Table 8. The RGB values of the image in Figure 16 
 Avg Med Min Max 
RGB:R 122 114 32 246 
RGB:G 122 114 32 246 
RGB:B 122 114 32 246 
 
Table 7 and Table 8 shows the average, median, minimum, and 
maximum values of the RGB values in Figure 15 and Figure 16, 
respectively. As shown in the tables, the brightness differences 
between the two images are negligible and difficult for a human 
observer to notice. 
 
 Infiltration 
LED (including IR LEDs) to camera communication has been 
studied and analyzed in prior research [44] [45]. The maximum 
bit rate and distance are mainly dependent upon the number of 
transmitting LEDs and the quality of the receiving camera. In 
this section we only examine the characteristic unique to the 
surveillance camera as a receiver. For more details on visible 
light and LED to camera communication, we refer the 
interested reader to [44] [45]. For testing and evaluation we 
generate IR using the transmitter described in Section VI. For 
the receiver we used two high-end Sony security cameras as 
well as HD webcam.  
 
1) Bit Rate  
The FPS of the security camera is the main factor limiting the 
bit rate per LED. However, in the case of infiltration, the 
attacker may use a number of LEDs to increase the bit rate. 
Table 9 compares the maximal bit rate for various 
configurations of transmitters and receivers.   
  
Table 9. Maximal bit rate for infiltration using one and eight IR 
LEDs and different cameras 
Tested 
Camera/Sensor 
FPS Max bit rate 
per IR LED 
Max bit 
rate using 
eight IR 
LEDs 
High-end security 
camera  
(Sony SNCEB600) 
30 15 bit/sec 120 bit/sec 
High-end security 
camera  (Sony 
SNCEB602R) 
 
30 15 bit/sec 120 bit/sec 
Webcam (HD)  
(Microsoft 
LifeCam) 
30 15 bit/sec 120 bit/sec 
 
 
2) Stealth 
The IR signals sent to the camera can be seen in the video 
stream as a white light. If the IR signals are strong, they may be 
detected by a person who observes the surveillance camera. In 
order to remain stealth, the IR signals must remain under certain 
thresholds so that they will be absorbed in the background of 
the images on the surveillance camera. For example, the 
attacker may use a small number of LEDs for transmission and 
only use them for a brief amount of time. 
  
 Distances 
One property of the covert channel is the communication range. 
In this section we discuss the communication ranges for the 
LOS and NLOS communication. 
 
 
1) LOS Communication 
The optical channel model is illustrated in Figure 17. The signal 
source is an array of IR LEDs on a surveillance camera that 
works in the NIR range. The typical receiver includes an 
appropriate optical filter to reduce the influence of the artificial 
lighting and illumination from the sun. Afterwards, the signal 
light is concentrated toward a photodetector (PD) by an optical 
lens system. The angular distribution of such lighting LED is 
commonly modeled by a generalized Lambertian radiant 
intensity model (measured in [sr-1]) of the form 
 
  1( ) cos ,
2
mmR  

  (1) 
where ϕ is the irradiance angle and 
 
 2 1/2
1
log cos( )
m  

 (2) 
 
is the Lambertian order with a semiangle of half power Φ1/2. 
The received power is calculated by 
 
  ( ) ,cosr tP P R L    (3) 
 
where Ω is the solid angle, tP  is the LED power, L is the optical 
system loss factor, and φ is the axial alignment of the detector. 
The approximated solid angle (measured in [sr]) is calculated 
by 
 
2
lA
d
   (4) 
where 2llA R  is the area of the outer concentration lens 
with radius Rl, d is the distance between the LEDs, and 
2
lA d  is assumed. For simplicity, multiple LED arrays 
inside a camera are modeled by a single powerful LED. The 
received signal (measured in A) is calculated by 
 ,r r nP ii    (5) 
where   is the photodetector responsivity (measured in A/W), 
and ni  is the electrical noise of the receiver. This noise is 
typically modeled by zero-mean Gaussian distribution with 
standard deviation σn. The resulting condition for a sufficiently 
low bit error rate is 10r nP  . Finally, the maximum 
distance is calculated by  
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Figure 17. Schematic illustration of an optical channel between 
the surveillance camera and a designated receiver. 
 
In a case of exfiltration, the signal source of the transmitter is 
the surveillance camera’s LEDs. Since different IR levels are 
used for modulation, the power difference between these levels 
( tP ) must be applied to Eq. (1). The analysis of the 
communication channel for the typical values in Table 10 
shows a communication distance of about 160 meters. 
Significant axial misalignment (higher ϕ angle) may 
significantly reduce this distance, while appropriate optical 
lenses may significantly increase this distance up to an order of 
magnitude. 
Table 10. Evaluation of the effective distance 
Symbol Value Typical Range 
Φ1/2 25o 15o-30o 
φ 5o 0o-10o 
L 0.8 0.75-0.95 
lR  2.5cm 1.5mm-5cm 
  0.5 0.5-0.8 
ϕ 25o  
n  10
-8
 A 10-6-10-11 A 
tP  4 W 1-20 W 
 
 
Figure 18. The effective distance as the function of the irradiance 
angle, ϕ, the axial detector angle, φ. 
 
The effective distance as the function of the irradiance angle, ϕ, 
the axial detector angle, φ, and the parameters from Table 10. 
The results show that both camera position and careful receiver 
alignment have notable influence on the communication 
distance. 
In a case of infiltration, theoretical analysis of the maximum 
distance highly depends on the parameters of the transmitter, 
such as the power of the light source. It also depends on the 
surveillance camera’s technical specifications, such as the 
resolution, focal lens, and more. However, previous works on 
the topic of LED to camera communication show that such 
communication is possible for distances of tens to hundreds of 
meters between the transmitter and the camera receiver. The 
rigorous analysis of LED to camera communication is out of the 
scope of this paper, and we refer the interested reader to several 
works in this field [46] [47] [48].  
  
2) NLOS Communication 
The operation principle of “night-vision” lighting is based on 
the diffuse back-reflection of light from the area of interest. 
However, this diffuse-reflected light may be used for NLOS 
exfiltration and infiltration.  
The common model that is based on Lambertian cosine 
reflection law is given by [49] 
   
   
2
2 2
1 2
1cos cos
4
1 1cos cos
m
r t l
area
mP P R
dA
D D
  

 
 


 , (7) 
where α is the incidence angle, β is the reflection angle, D1 and 
D2 are distances between the LED and the reflecting surface and 
between the surface and the detector, respectively (outlined in 
Figure 19), and ρ is the reflection coefficient. The integral is 
calculated over the whole illuminated area. It is important to 
note that the decrease in signal strength is proportional to the 
fourth power of the distance (~d-4). 
 
Figure 19. Schematic illustration of NLOS communication 
between the surveillance camera and a designated receiver. 
 
With high-end surveillance cameras, the effective exfiltration 
distance for NLOS communication is between 0 and 30 meters. 
This distance may be improved by using high quality optical 
sensors and lenses. Communication for greater distances is also 
available in some special scenarios, e.g., when the transmitting 
camera faces a wall or other types of reflective objects (α=0). 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 summarizes the feasible ranges for LOS and NLOS 
communication for the exfiltration and infiltration channels. 
 
Table 11. Effective distances of the LOS and NLOS 
communication  
 Line-of-sight Non line-of-sight 
Exfiltration Tens to hundreds of 
meters  
Tens of meters 
Infiltration Tens of meters to 
Kilometers 
Tens of meters 
 
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES 
General preventive countermeasures against optical emanation 
may include policies aimed to restrict the (optical) visibility of 
the emanated equipment. For example standards such as the 
NATO SDIP-27 (levels A/B/C) and SDIP-28 define classified 
zones for electronic equipment that can emanate signals [50] 
[51] [52] [53]. In the context of our attack, an organization may 
place surveillance cameras in restricted zones that are optically 
inaccessible to attackers. This type of countermeasure is less 
relevant to surveillance cameras that are intentionally pointing 
at public areas (e.g., at the street). For indoor cameras, it is 
possible to install an opaque window film that prevents optical 
visibility from outside the building [54]; note that this type of 
countermeasure doesn't protect against insider attacks or 
cameras located within the building.  
 Exfiltration 
Disabling the IR LEDs in the surveillance cameras may prevent 
the exfiltration channel presented in this paper. This strategy 
has two main drawbacks. First, disabling the IR LEDs 
effectively disables the night vision capability, which is an 
essential function of surveillance cameras. Second, as long 
disabling the IR LEDs is done at the software level (e.g., by 
changing the default settings), malware can re-enable it again. 
Even if disabling the IR LEDs is done at the firmware level, the 
surveillance camera itself may be compromised by malware 
(e.g., firmware level rootkit [55]) that can override these 
settings [56] [26] [57] [58]. A less elegant countermeasure 
against exfiltration attacks is to physically disconnect the 
camera's IR LEDs, or cover them with black tape which blocks 
the optical emanation [19]. Like the previous solution, such 
countermeasures effectively disable the night vision capability 
of the camera and decrease its usability. To prevent the 
exfiltration channel it is possible to implement a security 
component within the camera firmware. There are two types of 
firmware level security mechanisms that protect against the 
covert channels presented in this paper. The first approach is to 
add a minimal timeout between alterations to the status of the 
IR LEDs. Effectively, this will bound the potential bandwidth 
of the covert channel. The second approach - also known as 
signal jamming - is to invoke random IR blinking in the camera, 
so that the signals from the malicious code will get mixed up 
with the generated noise. Implementation of such a timeout 
mechanism or noise generator within the camera requires the 
involvement of the camera manufacturer and may also affect 
the usability of the IR LEDs.  
 
 Infiltration 
The infiltration channel can be prevented by adding an IR filter 
to the surveillance camera. That way, all IR signals will not pass 
through the recorded video. Although this solution is hermetic, 
it effectively eliminates the night vision capability of the 
camera, which is based on IR light. The infiltration channel can 
be detected mainly by analyzing the recorded video stream, 
searching for irregular LED activities. Note that such a solution 
must be done by performing offline video analysis. An LED 
detection solution may also suffer from a high rate of false 
positives in certain environments, e.g., it may raise false alerts 
for road lights and car lights. 
 
   Detecting Camera-Related Malware 
Technological countermeasures may include the detection of 
the presence of malware that controls the camera's IR LEDs or 
monitors the camera's input. The detection can take place at the 
host or network level. Detection at the host level involves the 
monitoring of irregular access to the network camera 
configurations’ APIs. For example, frequent access to the API 
may indicates that the IR LEDs are being manipulated for a 
malicious purpose. However, as with any other host-based 
detection, this approach can be evaded by malware which also 
resides on the host. Similarly, detection can be done at the 
network level, by monitoring the network traffic from hosts in 
the network to the surveillance cameras. In this case, it is 
possible to detect irregular access to the camera or identify the 
messages aimed at configuring the IR LEDs or reading the 
camera's input. Such a network-based detection requires deep 
packet inspection which might not always be possible (e.g., in 
the case of encrypted traffic). 
The countermeasures are summarized in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. List of countermeasures 
Type Countermeasure Limitations Relevancy 
Prevention Zoning, camera 
banning, and area 
restriction 
Insider 
threats (e.g., 
indoor 
cameras and 
malicious 
insiders) 
Infiltration/  
exfiltration  
Prevention LEDs covering / 
disconnecting  
Degradation 
of the night 
vision 
functionality 
and the user 
experience  
Exfiltration 
Prevention Window shielding High cost Infiltration/  
exfiltration 
Prevention 
(software / 
firmware) 
Timeout 
mechanisms, 
disabling IR control   
Requires 
OEM 
support, can 
Exfiltration 
be evaded by 
malware 
Prevention  Signal jamming Degradation 
of night 
vision 
functionality 
Infiltration/  
exfiltration 
Prevention Adding IR filter Degradation 
of night 
vision 
capability 
Infiltration 
Detection LED activity 
monitoring 
(external) 
Price Infiltration/  
exfiltration 
Malware 
Detection 
(network) 
Suspicious traffic 
detection (LED 
control)  
Not relevant 
if traffic is 
encrypted  
Exfiltration 
Malware 
Detection 
(host) 
Irregular access to 
camera's API 
Can be 
evaded by 
malware 
Infiltration/  
exfiltration 
Detection 
(video) 
Detect IR activity 
from the recorded 
video 
High false 
positive rate 
Infiltration/  
exfiltration 
 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Infrared light is invisible to humans but can be optically 
recorded by many types of cameras. In this paper we show how 
attackers can exploit indoor and outdoor surveillance cameras 
for data exfiltration and infiltration via IR illumination. In the 
exfiltration scenario, malware accesses the surveillance camera 
in the local network and generates covert IR signals by 
controlling the IR LEDs. Binary data is modulated, encoded, 
and transmitted over these signals. An attacker from a distance 
away with a line of sight to the surveillance camera can receive 
the IR signals and decode the binary information. In the 
infiltration scenario, covert IR signals are generated by a remote 
attacker with IR LEDs. These signals are then received by the 
surveillance camera and intercepted by malware within the 
network. We describe the attack model and provide scientific 
background about this optical covert channel, such as line-of-
sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) communication. We 
present data modulation schemas and a basic transmission 
protocol. We implement a malware prototype, evaluate it with 
different types of cameras and discuss preventive and defensive 
countermeasures. Our evaluation shows that an attacker can use 
IR and surveillance cameras to communicate over the air-gap 
to a distance of tens to hundreds of meters away. We 
demonstrate how data can be leaked from the network at a bit 
rate of 20 bit/sec (per camera) and be delivered to the network 
at bit rate of more than 100 bit/sec (per camera).  
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